



MD-M166 988 US FORSCOM ORGANIZATION AND MISSION: REMARKS BY GENERAL ROBERT W SENNEWAL (U) ARMY FORCES COMMAND FORT MCPHERSON GA 26 FEB 86

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 15/3 NL





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

AD-A166 988

(2)

US FORSCOM ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

Remarks by

GEN ROBERT W. SENNEWALD

at

AUSA Winter Defense Symposium

26 Feb 86

DTIC
SELECTED
APR 28 1986
S D
D

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

DTIC FILE COPY

56 4

363

CONFIDENTIAL
0679K/As OF 251400 FEB 86

AUSA WINTER DEFENSE SYMPOSIUM

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FL

26 FEBRUARY 1986

SLIDE #1:

GENERAL THURMAN, GENERAL MAHAFFEY, MR. SCHOETTELKOTTE (J. WALLACE SCHOETTELKOTTE, CIVILIAN AIDE TO SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR STATE OF FLORIDA), GENERAL COCKLIN (MG ROBERT F. COCKLIN, AUS RET. EXEC VP OF AUSA), FELLOW AUSA MEMBERS, AND FRIENDS OF THE ARMY.

I AM DELIGHTED TO BE WITH YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO TAKE PART IN THIS SYMPOSIUM: THE AUSA HAS A STRONG TRACK RECORD OF FOSTERING AN UNDERSTANDING OF LANDPOWER, BOTH AS A DETERRENT TO WAR AND AS THE DECISIVE ELEMENT IN WINNING A WAR SHOULD ARMED CONFLICT BECOME NECESSARY. THIS SYMPOSIUM PROMISES TO ADVANCE THAT UNDERSTANDING considerably; AND IT IS A PLEASURE TO BE ABLE TO TALK TO YOU TODAY ABOUT FORCES COMMAND.



Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

MY PURPOSE TODAY IS REALLY THREEFOLD:

FIRST, I WANT TO BRIEFLY REVIEW WITH YOU THE ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND.

NEXT, I WANT TO TELL YOU WHAT WE ARE DOING IN FORCES COMMAND TO ENSURE THAT OUR ARMY IS PREPARED TO PERFORM WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE OUR PRIMARY MISSION -- TO MOBILIZE AND GO TO WAR.

AND FINALLY, I WANT TO SPEND THE REST OF THE TIME I HAVE BEEN ALLOTTED DISCUSSING IN SOME DETAIL THE MAGNITUDE OF MOBILIZATION AND THE IMPACT IT WILL HAVE ON OUR WAY OF LIFE IN THIS COUNTRY.

SLIDE #2:

NOW, I KNOW THAT I'M TALKING TO THE CHOIR HERE. AND ALL OF YOU HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARMY LONG ENOUGH THAT I WON'T SPEND MUCH TIME TELLING YOU ABOUT FORCES COMMAND. YOU ALREADY KNOW FORCES COMMAND IS THE LARGEST OPERATIONAL COMMAND IN THE FREE WORLD. FORSCOM HEADQUARTERS IS AT FORT MCPHERSON IN ATLANTA; FORSCOM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COMBAT READINESS OF ALL STRATEGIC AND DEPLOYABLE ARMY FORCES IN THE 48 CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, ALASKA, PUERTO RICO, THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, AND PANAMA.

FORCES COMMAND OWNS NEARLY FIVE MILLION ACRES OF LAND, 20 MAJOR INSTALLATIONS AND 29 SUB-INSTALLATIONS. OUR BUDGET, TO INCLUDE SALARIES, EXCEEDS \$8 BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY. IN THE EVENT OF FULL MOBILIZATION, FORCES COMMAND WOULD NUMBER NEARLY ONE MILLION SOLDIERS -- ROUGHLY HALF OF THE ARMY'S TOTAL LAND COMBAT FORCES.

THE COMMANDER OF FORSCOM COMMANDS DIRECTLY THE ACTIVE ARMY AND U.S. ARMY RESERVE ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE FORSCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY; FORSCOM ALSO SUPERVISES THE TRAINING AND MONITORS THE READINESS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; THIS COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IS EXERCISED THROUGH THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES ARMIES, OR CONUSAS.

SLIDE #3:

FIVE OF THE SIX ARMIES ARE DESIGNATED CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES ARMIES OR CONUSAS. WITHIN THEIR REGIONS, EACH CONUSA EXTENDS COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER ALL ARMY RESERVE UNITS, ALONG WITH THE SUPERVISION OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING AND READINESS. DURING TIMES OF WAR, THE LAND DEFENSE OF THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THESE CONUSAS AS THEY BECOME THE INTERFACE WITH THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA).

SLIDE #4:

THE REMAINING ARMY HEADQUARTERS (THIRD U.S. ARMY) IS NOT A CONUSA, BUT A FIELD ARMY: WITH HEADQUARTERS AT FORT MCPHERSON. THIRD ARMY WAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE: HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY HAS A MISSION OF EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE: COMMANDED BY THE FORSCOM DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, IT SERVES AS THE ARMY COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS WITHIN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND. IT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL CONTINGENCY PLANNING, AS WELL AS COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY UNITS IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST ASIA THEATER: THIRD ARMY EXEMPLIFIES THE TOTAL ARMY CONCEPT: FROM THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF DOWN TO THE LOWEST ELEMENTS, IT CONSISTS OF ACTIVE DUTY, ARMY RESERVE, AND NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS: THESE RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS DO THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND ALSO PARTICIPATE IN ALL CONUS AND OVERSEAS EXERCISES ALONG SIDE OF THEIR ACTIVE DUTY COUNTERPARTS.

SLIDE #5:

THE TOTAL ARMY FORCES INVOLVED IN FORCES COMMAND ARE SHOWN
ON THIS SLIDE:

ACTIVE	274,667
USAR	279,480
ARNG	<u>439,773</u>
	993,920

SLIDE #6:

TO FULFILL FORSCOM'S MISSION, I WEAR SEVERAL "HATS." IF YOU
WILL, IN COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH VARIOUS UNIFIED COMMANDS.
I'VE ALREADY DESCRIBED MY ROLE AS FORCES COMMAND COMMANDER.
WHERE I REPORT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY.

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FOR ARLANT (FOR PLANNING), I HAVE THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO DO THE PLANNING NECESSARY TO COMMIT ARMY
FORCES WHEN JCS ACTIVATES ARLANT. WHEN THIS OCCURS, THEN AS
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ARLANT, I WOULD, WHEN DIRECTED, PROVIDE
AND EMPLOY THOSE FORCES AS THE ARMY COMPONENT OF LANTCOM,
COMMANDED BY ADMIRAL BAGLEY AT NORFOLK, FOR MISSIONS IN THE
ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN REGIONS.

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FOR USARRED, I AM THE ARMY COMPONENT FOR READINESS COMMAND, WHICH IS HEADQUARTERED HERE AT MACDILL UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL MAHAFFEY. I HAVE RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVIDING ARMY FORCES TO REDCOM FOR UTILIZATION BY THE VARIOUS UNIFIED COMMANDS AROUND THE WORLD.

I ALSO HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTHCOM COMMANDED BY GENERAL GALVIN IN PANAMA. I HAVE THE 193D INFANTRY BRIGADE AT FORT CLAYTON, COMMANDED BY MG FRED WOERNER, WHO WILL BECOME COMMANDER OF SIXTH ARMY ON THE 31ST OF MARCH.

THIS, BRIEFLY, IS A CAPSULE DESCRIPTION OF FORSCOM'S ORGANIZATION, LOCATION, AND HOW WE RELATE WITH VARIOUS OTHER COMMANDS.

SLIDE OFF:

OUR PURPOSE AT FORSCOM, VERY SIMPLY, IS TO PREPARE ARMY FORCES FOR MOBILIZATION AND COMMITMENT IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY: IN OTHER WORDS, OUR MAIN MISSION IS TO BE PREPARED TO GO TO WAR AND WE ARE PREPARING FOR WAR ON A DAILY BASIS: NOT BECAUSE WE ANTICIPATE A WAR TOMORROW, BUT BECAUSE OUR HIGH STATE OF READINESS STANDS AS A DETERRENT TO WAR.

EVERYTHING WE DO AS WE CHANGE OUR STRUCTURE, OUR EQUIPMENT, AND OUR TRAINING CONCEPTS ALL FOCUS ON MOBILIZING AND DEPLOYING THE FORCE: ALL THIS IS DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF READINESS. THAT'S REALLY THE KEY.

SLIDE #7:

PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DECISION TO AFFECT THE ARMY IN RECENT YEARS WAS THE DECISION TO FIX THE ACTIVE COMPONENT END STRENGTH OF THE ARMY AT 780,800 SOLDIERS. THIS DECISION HAS RESULTED IN A REALISTIC GOAL TOWARD WHICH WE COULD WORK. IT ALLOWS US TO BUILD A FORCE WE CAN REALISTICALLY MAN. NO LONGER WILL WE HAVE A "HOLLOW ARMY" WITH MORE SPACES THAN FACES.

WE HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF FAR-REACHING CHANGES TO THE FORCE STRUCTURE. WE'VE CHANGED THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF OUR DIVISIONS AND CORPS TO PROVIDE MORE COMBAT POWER AND WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME STREAMLINING THE STRUCTURE AND SAVING SPACES.

CREATION OF LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND INCREASES IN OUR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES HAVE ENHANCED OUR STRATEGIC DEPLOYABILITY AND IMPROVED OUR CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THREATS AT THE LOW END OF THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM.

SLIDE #8:

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ARMY PUTS INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE RESERVE COMPONENT. AT THIS TIME, 46 PERCENT OF THE COMBAT UNITS AND 70 PERCENT OF SUPPORT SERVICES ARE IN THE ARMY RESERVE AND ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; BY 1990, THE RESERVE COMPONENT WILL MAKE UP 52 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ARMY. TO ENABLE THESE UNITS TO PERFORM THEIR MISSIONS, THEY MUST BE EQUIPPED AND TRAINED AS WELL AS THE ACTIVE COMPONENT, AND THEY MUST BE FULLY DEPLOYABLE.

SLIDE #9:

EQUIPPING FORSCOM

--FORCE MODERNIZATION PEAK YEARS (FY 84-87)

--AFFECTING ALL FORSCOM ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS.

--MANY NEW MAJOR SYSTEMS BEING FIELDED

--EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION ON "FIRST TO FIGHT" BASIS

--EXTENSIVE IMPACT ON RESERVE COMPONENT

FY 84 - \$.9 BIL.

FY 85 - \$1.4 BIL.

SLIDE #10

TRAINING FORSCOM

- TRAINING IS #1 PRIORITY
 - MUST MAXIMIZE USE OF TRAINING TIME
 - CHANGING DOCTRINE, NEW EQUIPMENT, AND CONSTRAINED
-- RESOURCES ARE PART OF THE CHALLENGE
 - INCREASED EMPHASIS ON JOINT OPERATIONS
 - INCREASED USE OF TRAINING DEVICES AND SIMULATIONS
 - NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER IS KEY FOCUS FOR TRAINING
IN FORSCOM
 - SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN RESERVE COMPONENT OVERSEAS
 - DEPLOYMENT TRAINING
- | | |
|-------|-----------------|
| FY 80 | 1,200 SOLDIERS |
| FY 84 | 12,000 SOLDIERS |
| FY 85 | 26,000 SOLDIERS |
- TOUGH, REALISTIC TRAINING EQUALS BETTER READINESS

SLIDE #11:

EVERYTHING WE DO IN FORSCOM - STRUCTURING, EQUIPPING, TRAINING - HAS A DIRECT IMPACT ON OUR ABILITY TO MOBILIZE AND DEPLOY ARMY FORCES.

WHEN WE TALK MOBILIZATION, IT'S IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE MEAN.

--MOBILIZATION:

--ACT OF PREPARING FOR WAR OR OTHER EMERGENCIES THROUGH ASSEMBLING AND ORGANIZING NATIONAL RESOURCES.

--PROCESS BY WHICH THE SERVICES ASSEMBLE AND ORGANIZE THE PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES TO BRING THEIR FORCES TO A STATE OF READINESS FOR WAR OR OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY; (EMPHASIZE UNDERLINED WORDS.)

THE KEY POINT TO REMEMBER IS THAT MOBILIZATION IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT EVERY OPLAN AND CONPLAN OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS.

SLIDE OFF:

AND WHEN WE TALK ABOUT AND PLAN FOR MOBILIZATION, WE MUST ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION AND PRESIDENTIAL CALL-UPS THAT CAN OCCUR:

SLIDE #12:

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION IS EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE ARMED FORCES RESULTING FROM ACTION BY CONGRESS AND/OR THE PRESIDENT TO MOBILIZE RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS, INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVISTS, AND THE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR THEIR SUPPORT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A DOMESTIC EMERGENCY. THAT IS NOT THE RESULT OF AN ENEMY ATTACK:

FOR A DOMESTIC EMERGENCY, THE CONGRESS OR THE PRESIDENT MAY ORDER EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE ARMED FORCES BY MOBILIZATION OF RC UNITS AND/OR INDIVIDUAL RESERVISTS TO DEAL WITH A SITUATION WHERE THE ARMED FORCES MAY BE REQUIRED TO PROTECT LIFE, FEDERAL PROPERTY AND FUNCTIONS, OR TO PREVENT DISRUPTION OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES. A SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION NORMALLY WOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH A REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINGENCY PLANS INVOLVING EXTERNAL THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

PRESIDENTIAL CALL-UP OF 100,000 SELECTED RESERVISTS: THE PRESIDENT MAY AUGMENT THE ACTIVE FORCES BY A CALL-UP OF UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS OF THE SELECTED RESERVE UP TO 100,000 MEMBERS FOR UP TO 90 DAYS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN OPERATIONAL MISSION.

TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE (USC) 673B GIVES THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO ACTIVATE UP TO 100,000 SELECTED RESERVE MEMBERS IN VOLUNTARILY FOR NOT MORE THAN 90 DAYS WITHOUT DECLARING A NATIONAL EMERGENCY: THE 100,000 FIGURE REPRESENTS THE TOTAL SELECTED RESERVE MEMBERS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY DURING THIS TIME-FRAME: IF SOME RESERVISTS ARE RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY EARLY, OTHERS MAY BE ACTIVATED AS LONG AS THE TOTAL REMAINS WITHIN THE 100,000 CEILING AND THE ORIGINAL 90-DAY DURATION IS NOT EXCEEDED.

NO LIMIT EXISTS FOR RESERVISTS WHO VOLUNTEER FOR ACTIVE DUTY AND ARE CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY UNDER SOME AUTHORITY OTHER THAN TITLE 10 USC 673B. THE PRESIDENT MAY UTILIZE THE AUTHORITY WHEN HE DETERMINES IT NECESSARY TO AUGMENT THE ACTIVE FORCES FOR ANY OPERATIONAL MISSION. THIS AUTHORITY IS NOT MEANT TO CIRCUMVENT EXISTING CONTROLS ON ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTHS THROUGH SUCCESSIVE CALL-UPS OF RESERVISTS. THE 90-DAY DURATION FOR ACTIVATION IS SUFFICIENT TO CLARIFY THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER SOME DEGREE OF NATIONAL MOBILIZATION IS REQUIRED OR THAT NO FURTHER NEED FOR AUGMENTATION OF ACTIVE FORCES EXISTS.

SLIDE #13:

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION IS THE EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE ARMED FORCES RESULTING FROM ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT (NOT MORE THAN 1,000,000) OR CONGRESS (UP TO FULL MOBILIZATION) ~~OR THE PRESIDENT (NOT MORE THAN 1,000,000)~~ TO MOBILIZE READY RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS/INDIVIDUAL RESERVISTS AND RESOURCES NEEDED FOR THEIR SUPPORT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A WAR OR OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY INVOLVING AN EXTERNAL THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

FOR A CONTINGENCY OPERATION OR WAR PLAN. UPON DECLARATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY BY THE PRESIDENT, HE MAY ORDER AUGMENTATION OF THE ACTIVE ARMED FORCES (SHORT OF FULL MOBILIZATION) BY MOBILIZATION OF UP TO ONE MILLION MEN OF THE READY RESERVE (UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS) FOR UP TO 24 MONTHS.

THE CONGRESS MAY AUTHORIZE MOBILIZATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE.

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION EXISTS UNTIL THE EMERGENCY IS TERMINATED OR FULL MOBILIZATION IS ATTAINED.

SLIDE #14:

FULL MOBILIZATION REQUIRES ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS: FULL MOBILIZATION IS INITIATED AS A RESULT OF PASSAGE OF A PUBLIC LAW OR JOINT RESOLUTION DECLARING WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY. IT INVOLVES THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL RC UNITS IN THE EXISTING APPROVED FORCE STRUCTURE, ALL INDIVIDUAL RESERVISTS, RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE MATERIEL RESOURCES NEEDED FOR THIS EXPANDED FORCE STRUCTURE, TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A WAR OR OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY INVOLVING AN EXTERNAL THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY:

ACTIVE SERVICE IS FOR THE DURATION OF THE CONFLICT PLUS SIX MONTHS:

SLIDE #15:

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY: THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER MOBILIZATION LIES WITH THE PRESIDENT AND/OR CONGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WITH THE ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE SERVICE SECRETARIES AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, RECOMMENDS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS THE MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT A GIVEN CONTINGENCY, OPLAN OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY. THE SECDEF DIRECTS MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS AND MANPOWER THROUGH THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS:

SLIDE #16:

IN THE EVENT OF MOBILIZATION, ALL OR ANY PORTION OF THE FORCES SHOWN HERE WOULD BE ACTIVATED AND ABSORBED INTO THE ACTIVE ARMY: IF WE WENT TO FULL MOBILIZATION, THE ACTIVE FORCE WOULD EXPAND BY ABOUT 1.3 MILLION SOLDIERS: THIS FORCE WOULD BE MOBILIZED IN ABOUT 18 DAYS, WITH MOST COMING ON ACTIVE DUTY WITHIN THE FIRST 5 OR 6 DAYS:

SLIDE #17:

THE PROCESS BY WHICH WE TRANSITION TO WAR IS SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE: ONCE THE UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN ALERTED AND NOTIFIED, WHICH IS WHAT WE CALL M-DAY, THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS GETS INTO HIGH GEAR RATHER QUICKLY:

THIS SLIDE ILLUSTRATES GRAPHICALLY HOW THE "FORSOM SOLDIER" MOVES THROUGH THE MOBILIZATION:

DO NOT LET THE SIMPLICITY OF THIS SLIDE FOOL YOU - THE SYSTEMS THAT SUPPORT THIS PROCESS ARE NUMEROUS AND COMPLEX.

PEACETIME PREPARATION IS THE FOUNDATION TO SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION: WE MUST DO ALL THAT WE CAN IN PEACETIME TO SPEED THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS:

UPON ALERT WE MUST BE ABLE TO LOCATE THE RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIER IN HIS CIVILIAN COMMUNITY AND NOTIFY HIM TO REPORT TO HIS LOCAL ARMORY OR RESERVE CENTER.

AT HOME STATION HE RECEIVES SOME ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING AS TIME ALLOWS BEFORE MOVEMENT TO ONE OF 53 MOBILIZATION STATIONS.

AT MOBILIZATION STATION. THE FORSCOM SOLDIER MUST BE FED, HOUSED, EQUIPPED, TRAINED, AND ADMINISTRATIVELY PROCESSED FOR OVERSEAS: THE MOB STATION THROUGH PEACETIME PLANNING KNOWS WHAT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PLACED ON THE INSTALLATION.

WHEN A UNIT WILL ARRIVE AT A MOBILIZATION STATION AND HOW LONG IT WILL REMAIN THERE WILL VARY FROM A FEW DAYS TO SEVERAL WEEKS, DEPENDING UPON THE UNIT AND ITS MISSION. AT THE MOB STATION, THE UNIT WILL RECEIVE FILLS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, AND WILL PREPARE ITS OWN EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT.

THE MOB STATION TRANSPORTATION OFFICER COORDINATES MOVEMENT OF THE UNIT DIRECTLY WITH THE TRANSPORTATION OPERATING AGENCIES.

THE UNIT IS THEN MOVED THROUGH THE PORT OF EMBARKATION TO THE OVERSEAS THEATER AND EMPLOYED BY THE SUPPORTED CINC.

SOUNDS SIMPLE? LET ME TELL YOU THAT IT WON'T WORK UNLESS WE CONTINUALLY PLAN IN PEACETIME TOWARDS THE EVENTUALITY:

SLIDE #18:

IF MOBILIZATION SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY, THE RESERVE COMPONENT WILL BE INVOLVED IN COMBAT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. CERTAIN UNITS WHICH ARE EARMARKED AS "EARLY DEPLOYERS" WILL BE MOVED TO THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN A MATTER OF DAYS.

THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT MIX IN U.S. ARMY EUROPE AS AN EXAMPLE. IN THE EVENT OF MOBILIZATION IN FULFILLMENT OF OUR NATO COMMITMENT, AS YOU CAN SEE, RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES WILL BE ON THE GROUND IN EUROPE WITHIN TEN DAYS OF MOBILIZATION. AND THE PERCENTAGE OF RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES INVOLVED INCREASES FROM 5% AT D-DAY-PLUS-10 TO 56% AT D-DAY-PLUS-90.

SLIDE #19:

THIRTY-ONE YEARS AGO, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY RECOGNIZED BOTH THE IMPORTANCE OF MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND THE FACT THAT WE WEREN'T DOING A VERY GOOD JOB OF IT THEN.

"IT CAN STILL BE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER ADEQUATELY AND FULLY PLANNED FOR A MOBILIZATION BEFORE IT OCCURRED."

DA PAMPHLET 20-212

JUNE 1955

I'M HERE TO TELL YOU THAT WE ARE DOING A LOT BETTER AT PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR MOBILIZATION THAN EVER BEFORE. BUT WE ARE NOT OUT OF THE WOODS YET;

THERE ARE SEVERAL MAJOR AREAS AND ISSUES WHERE WE MUST FOCUS OUR EFFORTS IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO MEET OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO PREPARE FOR WAR: SOME OF THE MAIN AREAS OF CONCERN TO ME ARE THESE:

SLIDE #20:

- COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS.
- 100K CALL-UP AND PARTIAL MOBILIZATION.
- INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE.
- FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRESS AFTER MOBILIZATION.

SLIDE #21:

COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS: MOBILIZATION IS
HUNDREDS OF
EXTREMELY COMPLEX: THERE ARE LITERALLY ^A THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE -
ACTIVE, RESERVE, AND CIVILIAN - INVOLVED. TO SAY NOTHING OF THE
MANY INSTALLATIONS AND COMMANDS: EVERYTHING HAS TO FIT, AND
THE ONLY WAY IT WILL IS IF WE PRACTICE:

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOLLOWING MOBILIZATION ARE NOT THE
SAME AS THEY ARE BEFORE MOBILIZATION: EVEN AFTER MOBILIZATION,
THESE RELATIONSHIPS CHANGE AS A UNIT MOVES FROM HOME STATION TO
THE OVERSEAS THEATER.

FEMA PROVIDES THE ESSENTIAL CONNECTION FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN MOBILIZATION. ALL COORDINATION INVOLVING FINANCIAL, MATERIEL, TRANSPORTATION, FACILITIES, MEDICAL AND SOCIAL SERVICES, AND MANPOWER WILL BE HANDLED THROUGH FEMA; THE CONUSA HQS WILL PROVIDE THE INTERFACE FOR THE ARMY WITH FEMA.

IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THOSE WHO ARE INVOLVED IN ANY ASPECT OF MOBILIZATION UNDERSTAND ALL THE ASPECTS OF MOBILIZATION, AND THE PLANNING AND COORDINATION INVOLVED, AND PRACTICE IT.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE FIRST TEAM PLAYERS BE THE PARTICIPANTS IN EXERCISES WHERE WE EXERCISE OUR MOBILIZATION PLANS. THE COMMANDING GENERAL, THE G-3, THE TRANSPORTATION OFFICER -- NOT THEIR ASSISTANT OR A SUBSTITUTE -- MUST BE THE ONES TO MAKE THE DECISIONS AND ISSUE THE ORDERS DURING EXERCISES. THEY ARE THE KEY PLAYERS. THEY HAVE TO BE ABLE TO DO IT IN THE EVENT OF MOBILIZATION; THEY MUST PRACTICE DURING PEACETIME; AND WE MUST PRACTICE OFTEN, USING PRE-SCRIPTED MOBILIZATION EXERCISES WHICH WE HAVE AVAILABLE.

SLIDE #22:

100K AND PARTIAL MOBILIZATION PACKAGES: YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE 100K PRESIDENTIAL CALL-UP AUTHORITY ALLOWS FOR A TOTAL OF 100K FOR ALL SERVICES: ONLY ABOUT 40,000 TO 60,000 OF THOSE WOULD BE ARMY, AND OF THAT NUMBER, MAYBE 40% WOULD ACTUALLY BE DEPLOYED TO THE COMBAT THEATER: THAT'S NOT MUCH COMBAT POWER. MOST OF THE ARMY COMPONENT OF A 100K CALL-UP WILL BE COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT. THE POINT IS, 100K MIGHT BE TOO SMALL: PERHAPS THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OUGHT TO BE EXPANDED TO ALLOW FOR A 200K CALL-UP: THAT, OF COURSE, WOULD REQUIRE STATUTORY CHANGES.

AS FAR AS PARTIAL MOBILIZATION IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE NEVER ACTUALLY DONE ONE: CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS FOR EACH STEP IN THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS FROM 100K CALL-UP THROUGH TOTAL MOBILIZATION. IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR EACH TYPE OF MOBILIZATION SHOULD RESULT IN A MORE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ACCESSION OF UNITS INTO THE ACTIVE ARMY.

WITH REGARD TO UNITS, MANY ACTIVE UNITS WITH PEACETIME INSTALLATION SUPPORT MISSIONS DEPLOY VERY EARLY, JUST AT THE TIME MOBILIZING UNITS ARE REPORTING AT MOBILIZATION STATIONS AND REQUIRE SUPPORT. A LARGE NUMBER OF UNITS IN THE 100K CALL-UP ALSO DEPLOY EARLY, GIVING THEM A LIMITED SUPPORT CAPABILITY WHILE THEY PREPARE FOR DEPLOYMENT. AN ARMOR BATTALION, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH MUST PREPARE ITS TANKS FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT ON D+17 AND REMAINS AT THE MOBILIZATION STATION UNTIL D+43 WILL BE VERY LIMITED IN ITS ABILITY TO TRAIN.

CURRENT MOBILIZATION PLANS CALL FOR MOST MILITARY DOCTORS NOW ASSIGNED TO INSTALLATION HOSPITALS IN THE U.S. TO BE REASSIGNED TO DEPLOYING UNITS. THIS WILL SERIOUSLY LIMIT THE INSTALLATION'S CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE HEALTH CARE TO SOLDIERS, TO SAY NOTHING OF FAMILY MEMBERS, AT A TIME WHEN MOBILIZATION INSTALLATION POPULATIONS SURGE AS MOBILIZED UNITS ARRIVE.

A PARTIAL OR FULL MOBILIZATION OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT MIGHT SERIOUSLY IMPACT ON BOTH DEFENSE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES AND THOSE OF SOME DEFENSE CONTRACTORS. MANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE MEMBERS OF RESERVE UNITS. AT THIS POINT, WE HAVE NOT YET ACCURATELY ASSESSED THE IMPACT OF SUCH AN EVENT.

SLIDE #23:

IRR: THE IRR (INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE) PRESENTS SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS: THE IRR NOW TOTALS 326K: AS MORE AND MORE SOLDIERS LEAVE ACTIVE DUTY WITH 8 YEAR TOTAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS INSTEAD OF 6 YEARS AS IT USED TO BE. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN THE IRR WILL CLIMB TO OVER 400K: THE IRR CONTAINS MANY DIFFERENT TYPES. NONE OF WHOM ARE IN THE ARMY. AND WE MUST KEEP THIS IN MIND:

--SOME OUTSTANDING SOLDIERS.

--SOME ADMINISTRATIVE RELEASES FROM ACTIVE DUTY (SOME GOOD. SOME BAD).

--SOME OUT FOR A FEW MONTHS; OTHERS A FEW YEARS.

--BUT ALL WERE ORIGINALLY VOLUNTEERS.

WE ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER THE PHYSICAL CONDITION, LOCATION. AND SKILL RETENTION OF THESE SOLDIERS: REMEMBER, THEY DO NOT HAVE THE SAME PHYSICAL STANDARDS AS ACTIVE DUTY SOLDIERS. BUT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCESS, INTEGRATE AND TRAIN THEM IN WHATEVER TIME WE HAVE.

IN JANUARY 1986, WE CONDUCTED THE FIRST MUSTER EVER OF OUR ARMY: THIS WAS A VOLUNTARY MUSTER. THE MUSTER INVOLVED 13 CITIES ACROSS THE U:S: A TOTAL OF 6,677 INDIVIDUALS WERE MUSTERED DURING THE FOUR WEEKENDS INVOLVED. THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED TOOK THE PRELIMINARY COMMON TASKS (COMBAT SKILLS) TEST, GOT MEDICAL EVALUATION, UPDATED THEIR RECORDS, AND GOT PAID:

THE RESULTS WERE ENCOURAGING. MOST WERE STILL FAMILIAR WITH THE M-16 RIFLE, THE PROTECTIVE MASK, AND FIRST AID. AS EXPECTED, HOWEVER, THE WEAKER AREAS WERE KNOWLEDGE OF NEW EQUIPMENT AND MAP READING.

THE REACTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS WAS VERY FAVORABLE. ONE SERGEANT FROM CALIFORNIA WHO WAS PARTICIPATING IN AN EXPEDITION CLIMBING MOUNT EVEREST WHEN HIS NOTIFICATION LETTER ARRIVED AT HIS FATHER'S HOME FLEW BACK FROM NEPAL IN TIME TO ATTEND THE MUSTER IN OAKLAND: THAT'S AN EXTREME EXAMPLE, BUT IT SHOWS THAT THE IRR IS A RELIABLE SOURCE OF SOLDIERS. AND REMEMBER, THIS MUSTER WAS COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY:

WE'D LIKE TO HAVE MORE MUSTERS AND EVENTUALLY MOVE TOWARD HAVING A MANDATORY MUSTER ON AN ANNUAL BASIS. UNFORTUNATELY, BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS HAVE CAUSED THE ARMY TO HAVE TO CANCEL OTHER MUSTERS WE HAD PLANNED DURING FY86. AT THIS POINT, THE FUTURE OF ANY MORE IRR MUSTERS IS VERY MUCH IN DOUBT. BUT IT IS A VERY CRITICAL AREA THAT NEEDS TO BE EXERCISED REGULARLY.

SLIDE #25:

FAMILY SUPPORT AFTER MOBILIZATION: THERE ARE REALLY TWO AREAS OF CONCERN HERE: FIRST, WHEN WE MOBILIZE, THE FAMILY MEMBERS OF ALL THOSE NEWLY MOBILIZED SERVICE MEMBERS IMMEDIATELY BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR ALL THE SUPPORT OUR ACTIVE FORCE NOW RECEIVES -- HEALTH CARE, CHAMPUS, COMMISSARY, POST EXCHANGE -- THEY'LL ALL NEED ID CARDS AND THEY'LL BECOME ENTITLED TO FAMILY HOUSING. IN THE CASE OF FULL MOBILIZATION, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT 1.3 MILLION MORE FAMILIES TO BE ABSORBED WITHIN A VERY BRIEF PERIOD.

SECOND, IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES OVERSEAS, FAMILY MEMBERS WILL BE EVACUATED BACK TO THE U.S. AND APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF OF THE SOLDIERS NOW STATIONED IN EUROPE HAVE FAMILIES WITH THEM WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE EVACUATED. IN WEST GERMANY ALONE THERE ARE ABOUT 300,000 DoD NON-COMBATANTS.

ASIDE FROM THE PROBLEMS OF WHEN TO IMPLEMENT EVACUATION, THERE ARE THE LARGER ISSUES OF:

1. GETTING THE NON-COMBATANTS BACK TO THE U.S., AND
- 2: RECEIVING THEM IN THE U.S. AND PROVIDING FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND
3. PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THEM IN THE U.S. ONCE THEY ARE RETURNED.

WE ANTICIPATE THAT MOST NON-COMBATANTS WILL BE TRANSPORTED ON MILITARY AND CRAF (CIVILIAN RESERVE AIR FLEET) AIRCRAFT USED DURING DEPLOYMENT; AND THE ARMY HAS DEVELOPED THE JOINT PLAN FOR RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF DOD NON-COMBATANT EVACUEES (ROMODNE) FOR THE EXPEDITED ADMINISTRATIVE RETURN OF NON-COMBATANTS OVER A PROTRACTED PERIOD. BUT WE HAVE NEVER EXERCISED THIS PLAN. WE REALLY CAN'T SAY FOR CERTAIN IT WILL WORK; WE REALLY NEED TO PRACTICE AND EXERCISE THIS PLAN TO ENSURE THAT THE CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN ALL AGENCIES CONCERNED TAKES PLACE. WE NEED TO DISCOVER THE "SHOW-STOPPERS" NOW.

SLIDE #26:

BUT MOBILIZATION GOES FAR BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE CONCERNS OF THE ARMED SERVICES: MOBILIZATION IS A NATIONAL ISSUE, AND WILL PLACE EXTREME DEMANDS UPON THE RESOURCES OF OUR COUNTRY. MOBILIZATION WILL CHANGE OUR WAY OF LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES.

SLIDE #27:

TO PROVIDE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE
IMPACT OF MOBILIZATION AND THE DECLARATION OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY. CONSIDER WHAT HAPPENS IN JUST A FEW AREAS:

--MANPOWER.

--PROCUREMENT AND DEFENSE PRODUCTION.

--TRANSPORTATION.

--COMMUNICATIONS.

--PROPERTY.

SLIDE #28:

ANOTHER MANPOWER ISSUE THAT MUST BE DEALT WITH EARLY IS
THAT OF INDUCTION, OR THE DRAFT. INDUCTION AUTHORITY IS
ASSUMED FOR THE EXECUTION OF ANY MAJOR GLOBAL PLANNING SCENARIO.

THIS PRESENTS A PROBLEM BECAUSE EXISTING LEGISLATION
PERMITS THE PRESIDENT TO:

--REGISTER YOUNG MEN FOR THE DRAFT.

--ORDER THEIR EXAMINATION AND CLASSIFICATION.

THE CURRENT MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT SETS THE TERMS OF ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE FOR CONSCRIPTS AT A MAXIMUM OF 24 MONTHS IN PEACETIME OR FOR THE DURATION OF A WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY, PLUS SIX MONTHS. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE INDUCTION AUTHORITY: IN FACT, THE MECHANISM BY WHICH WE WOULD INDUCT CONSCRIPTS DOES NOT EXIST AT THIS TIME.

THE SPEED AND MAGNITUDE OF MANPOWER AUGMENTATION FROM CONSCRIPTION WILL BE GOVERNED BY:

--THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO REQUEST INDUCTION;

--THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THE CONGRESS TO ENACT INDUCTION AUTHORITY;

--THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM TO ISSUE INDUCTION ORDERS;

--THE RATE AT WHICH INDUCTEES CAN BE RECEIVED AND PROCESSED THROUGH MEPS AND TRANSPORTED TO TRAINING BASES.

--THE LENGTH OF TRAINING AND THE EXPANSION CAPACITY OF THE TRAINING BASE.

EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES ARE ITEMS OF LEGISLATION THAT PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT AND DOD EXTRAORDINARY ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES (MANPOWER, MONEY, FACILITIES, AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION) OF THE NATION SO THAT, IN AN EMERGENCY, WE CAN MOBILIZE AND SUSTAIN OUR WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY.

THE DIGEST OF WAR AND EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE DOD IDENTIFIES CLOSE TO 400 SEPARATE ITEMS OF LEGISLATION THAT CAN BE CATEGORIZED AS EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES. LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE INDUCTION AUTHORITY IS NOT INCLUDED AMONG THE 400 OTHER ITEMS.

SLIDE #29:

MOBILIZATION OF THE RC WILL OCCUR AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS MOBILIZING TO INCREASE PRODUCTION TO MEET WARTIME DEFENSE NEEDS. ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING INDUCTION SHOULD ALSO OCCUR WITHIN A SHORT TIME FOLLOWING FULL MOBILIZATION. THESE EVENTS ALL WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE NATION'S WORK FORCE.

--KEY INDUSTRY PERSONNEL WHO ARE RESERVISTS MAY BE MOBILIZED, OR THEY MAY BE DRAFTED.

--BOTH THE MILITARY AND INDUSTRY WILL BE DRAWING FROM THE SAME MANPOWER POOL TO REACH MOBILIZATION STRENGTHS.

--MANY CIVILIANS CAN EXPECT TO HAVE THEIR CAREERS OR EDUCATION INTERRUPTED FOR AS LONG AS THE DURATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY, PLUS SIX MONTHS:

SLIDE #30:

THE ARRIVAL OF MOBILIZED UNITS AT MILITARY POSTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WITHIN A SHORT TIME OF THE DECLARATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY WILL PLACE INCREASED DEMANDS ON RESOURCES OF THE LOCAL AREA: AND IF THESE UNITS REMAIN FOR EXTENDED PERIODS (I.E., IF THEY ARE MOBILIZED BUT DO NOT DEPLOY FOR A LONG TIME), THE BURDEN MAY BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED.

CLOSE COORDINATION AND JOINT PLANNING BETWEEN MILITARY LEADERS AND COMMUNITY OFFICIALS IN AREAS SURROUNDING MOBILIZATION SITES ARE ESSENTIAL TO AVOID DISRUPTION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES OR DAMAGE TO COMMUNITY RELATIONS.

SLIDE #31:

THE IMPACT OF MOBILIZATION ON THE MILITARY AND THE NATION IS FAR-REACHING: EVERY PERSON IN THE COUNTRY WILL BE AFFECTED IN SOME WAY, AND ALL THE RESOURCES AND SYSTEMS WE HAVE WILL FEEL THE EFFECTS: IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSITION TO WAR THAT PLANNING BE CONDUCTED CONTINUOUSLY, IN GREAT DETAIL, AND THAT CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN ALL ELEMENTS, WHETHER IN THE MILITARY OR CIVILIAN SECTOR, TAKE PLACE: ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ROUTINELY EXERCISE OUR MOBILIZATION PLANS TO ENSURE THEY WILL WORK, AND THAT THE KEY PLAYERS KNOW THEIR ROLES.

SLIDE #32:

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE RESERVE COMPONENTS ARE ESSENTIAL.

AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY POINTED OUT IN JANUARY
1984:

"EVERY MAJOR ARMY OPERATIONAL PLAN'S TROOP
LIST CONTAINS RESERVE UNITS: WE HAVE AN
INCREASING RELIANCE ON THE RESERVE
COMPONENT: OUR PLANS MUST BE ALIGNED TO
INSURE EARLY AND EFFECTIVE CALL-UP AND
POST MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT OF THOSE
(RC) UNITS THAT PROVIDE THE TACTICAL
STAYING POWER."

THOSE WORDS ARE EVEN MORE TRUE TODAY THAN THEY WERE TWO
YEARS AGO.

SLIDE #33:

I THINK YOU CAN SEE THAT THIS BUSINESS OF MOBILIZATION IS
COMPLEX, CRITICAL TO THE ABILITY OF OUR ARMY TO SUPPORT
NATIONAL POLICY, AND EXTENSIVE IN SCOPE. AND GETTING THE JOB
DONE IS CERTAINLY EXCITING WORK:

SLIDE OFF:

MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND PREPARATION IS A TERRIFIC CHALLENGE: NOT ALL THE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED. BUT WE HAVE GOOD PEOPLE WORKING ON THOSE PROBLEMS.

WE IN THE ARMY APPRECIATE THE SUPPORT WE RECEIVE FROM AUSA. YOUR INTEREST IN LANDPOWER. THROUGH FORUMS SUCH AS THIS ONE. CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY TO FURTHERING THE PUBLIC'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES AND THE NEEDS OF THE ARMY. I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE WITH YOU MY PERCEPTIONS OF WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE NEED TO GO IN FORCES COMMAND WITH REGARD TO MOBILIZATION.

WE ARE PREPARED TO DO OUR JOB IN COMBAT. WE TRAIN HARD EVERY DAY TO MAINTAIN THAT FIGHTING EDGE: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE PROVIDED US THE RESOURCES TO ENABLE US TO BUILD A CREDIBLE DETERRENT FORCE. A MOBILIZATION WILL FORCE TREMENDOUS BURDENS ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. BUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAGNITUDE AND IMPACT OF MOBILIZATION ON EVERYONE WILL HELP GREATLY IN BECOMING FULLY PREPARED.

WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO MOVE AHEAD: WITH YOUR CONTINUED HELP AND SUPPORT. WE WILL ACHIEVE OUR GOALS.

END

DT/C

5 — 86